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Comments

THE OBJECTIVES OF ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE:
A PENNSYLVANIA VIEW

I.

INTRODUCTION

Recently dramatic changes have occurred in the area of ethics
and discipline in the legal profession. The outdated Canons of Professional Ethics were replaced by a new Code of Professional Responsibility,1 which was adopted by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania on May 20, 1970.2 In addition, Pennsylvania's disciplinary
procedures were completely revised after publication of the reports
of the Special Committee on Evaluation of Disciplinary Enforcement of the American Bar Association 3 and the Special Committee
on Disciplinary Procedures of the Board of Governance of the
4
Pennsylvania Bar.
Since these changes necessitated the expenditure of a considerable effort by the legal profession, the question arises as to
the motivations which prompted the profession to initiate this industrious undertaking. In seeking to answer this question, this
Comment will examine the objectives of discipline in the legal profession. More specifically, the analysis will focus on Pennsylvania
case law in order to ascertain the traditionally espoused aims of
lawyer discipline. In addition, the presently espoused objectives

will be discussed along with possible underlying aims not explicitly
cited by the courts or the bar. An evaluation of the objectives will
also be presented in an attempt to determine if certain goals need
more or less emphasis by the profession and the judiciary. Suggestions as to additional, unrecognized goals will also be considered.
1. The Code of Professional Responsibility was adopted by the House
of Delegates of the American Bar Association on August 12, 1969, to become
effective on January 1, 1970.
2. Supreme Court Rules Docket No. 1, page 10; 438 Pa. xxv.
3. Hereinafter referred to as the Clark Committee. The Committee
was chaired by retired United States Supreme Court Justice Tom Clark.
4. This Committee's report and recommendations were the basis for
the present disciplinary structure and rules now existing in Pennsylvania.
See note 109 and accompanying textiira:.
-
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Finally, several recommendations of Pennsylvania's relatively new
Disciplinary Board5 will be analyzed to ascertain if the results
reached comply with the currently espoused objectives of attorney
discipline.
II.

TRADITIONALLY EsPousED OBJECTIVES OF ATToRNEY
DISCIPLINE

It was established early in Pennsylvania that the primary objective of attorney discipline was protective in nature. The Supreme Court in an appeal from a disbarment order announced that
"the end to be attained by removal, is not punishment, but protection." While it is generally agreed that the primary goal of discipline in the legal profession is protection, the cases have been in
mild conflict as to who is being protected and for what purpose.
The earlier decisions stressed the fact that the court's inherent
disciplinary power over attorneys was essential to protect itself.
While other purposes were recognized, the decisions relied often on
this need "to protect the court and the administration of justice.
"98

However, it was soon accepted that there were other purposes
served in the disciplining of attorneys. Justice Mercur, writing for
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in In re Davies,9 affirmed a lower
court's disbarment order noting that by its very nature disbarment
required "sound judicial discretion guarding and protecting the just
rights and independence of the bar, the dignity and authority of
the court, and the safety and protection of the public."' 1 This decision, relying in part on a statement of Chief Justice Taney in Ex
parte Secombe,11 became a cornerstone for subsequent disbarment
5. Hereinafter referred to as the Board. The Disciplinary Board of
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has exclusive jurisdiction over disciplinary matters and was to become effective in all matters on September 1,
1972. This date was later extended to November 1, 1972. See the PA. R.
DIscwIntARY ENFORcEMENT.

6. In re Austin, 5 Rawle 191, 20a (Pa. 1835).
7. Id.; Commonwealth ex ret. M'Laughlin v. Judges of the District
Court, 5 W. & S.272, 274 (Pa. 1843).
8. In re Austin, 5 Rawle 191, 203 (Pa. 1835).
9. 93 Pa. 116 (1880).
10. Id.at 121.
11. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 9,13 (1856):
The power, however, isnot an arbitrary and despotic one, to be
exercised at the pleasure of the court, or from passion, prejudice,
or personal hostility; but it is the duty of the court to exercise and
regulate it by a sound and just judicial discretion, whereby the
rights and independence of the bar may be as scrupulously guarded

proceedings in the Commonwealth. Thereafter, the three objectives
expounded by Judge Mercur were often stated by the courts to
justify and explain the exercising of their power to discipline those
attorneys who transgressed the ethical codes.12
It seems clear that in imposing disciplinary sanctions on attorneys, the courts were seeking to protect themselves in two ways.
First, by removing those who were no longer worthy to hold the
position of "officer of the court." Lawyers have always held a position of trust and confidence in the court structure. 13 Once a practitioner showed himself to be unworthy of such trust, the court had
to remove him from the rolls so as not to be harmed by any future
misconduct.1 4 The second objective was to avoid eroding the necessary public confidence in and respect for the courts as the administrators of justice. Undoubtedly, this goal would be difficult to accomplish if the courts retained officers who previously demonstrated that they were unworthy to hold such a position.' 5
Yet, as pointed out by Justice Mercur in In re Davies,10 the
courts were not the only ones in need of protection. The individual
client or the public in general would most likely be more seriously
harmed by an attorney's misconduct. One court succinctly stated:
The interest of the people at large should be conserved by
the court, in order that those who must of necessity place
their property, their liberty, and even their lives in the care
of an attorney should be secure in their confidence in the
integrity of their advocate. They should be assured that
whatever misfortune may happen to them, they will not be
despoiled
by the one in whom they have placed their
17
trust.

The third group in need of protection according to the court
in In re Davies's was the profession itself. This objective was noted
early in a United States Supreme Court case cited by the Pennsylvania decisions. Chief Justice Marshall expressed the view that
the power to discipline was "necessary for the preservation of decorum, and for the respectability of the profession."' 9 The cases
and maintained by the court, as the rights and dignity of the court
itself.
12. In re Schofield, 362 Pa. 201, 215, 222, 66 A.2d 675, 682, 685 (1949);
In re Oliensis, 26 Pa. Dist. R. 853, 860-63 (C.P. Phila. 1917); Heindel's Case,
15- York Co. L.R. 77, 81 (Pa. C.P. 1901); In re Kennedy, 12 Lanc. L. Rev.
257, 259 (Pa. C.P. 1895), aff'd, 178 Pa. 232, 35 A. 995 (1896). See also PA.
R.DiscipLn'uMy ENFORCEMENrT 17-18 (c).
13. Comment, The Imposition of Disciplinary Measures for the Misconduct of Attorneys, 52 COL. L. Rsv. 1039 (1952).
14. In re Chernoff, 344 Pa. 527, 534, 26 A.2d 335, 339 (1942).
15. In re Gottesfeld, 245 Pa. 314, 317, 91 A. 494, 495 (1914).
16. 93 Pa. 116 (1880).
17. In re Maires, 21 Pa. C.C. Rep. 69, 70 (C.P. Phila. 1898), affd, 189
Pa. 99, 41 A. 988 (1899).
18. 93 Pa. 116 (1880).
19. Ex parte Burr, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 529, 531 (1824).

Comments
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

suggest that there are several goals or objectives of attorney discipline in this respect. These have been espoused as a desire to maintain high moral standards within the bar,20 to preserve the bar's harmony with the bench, 21 and most importantly to preserve the profession's reputation for integrity and honor thus retaining the public's confidence in and respect for the profession.2 2 "The dignity
and importance of the Profession of the Law, in a public point of
view," Justice Sharswood wrote, "can hardly be overestimated." 23
While protection of the courts, the public and the legal profession are cited most often as the goals of attorney discipline, it seems
implicit within the concept of discipline itself that punishment and
deterrence are additional objectives in the imposition of sanctions
on lawyers. Generally, punishment has been disclaimed by the
courts as an objective, 24 however, occasionally it is said to be included in the goals of disciplinary actions. 25 The more widely accepted view is that disciplinary actions are not for the purpose of
punishment, but that punishment is only incidental. 26 Furthermore,
20. Johnson Disbarment Case, 421 Pa. 342, 345, 219 A.2d 593, 595
(1966); In re Chernoff, 344 Pa. 527, 534, 26 A.2d 335, 339 (1942); In re Disbarment Proceedings, 321 Pa. 81, 98, 184 A. 59, 66 (1936); Forman's Case,
321 Pa. 47, 48, 184 A. 75, 76 (1936); In re Letizia, 27 Cambria Co. L.J. 30,
39 (Pa. C.P. 1965).
21. Ex parte Burr, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 529, 530 (1824).
22. Johnson Disbarment Case, 421 Pa. 342, 345, 219 A.2d 593, 595
(1966); Forman's Case, 321 Pa. 47, 48, 184 A. 75, 76 (1936); In re Maires,
21 Pa. C.C. Rep. 69, 70 (C.P. Phila. 1898), afl'd, 189 Pa. 99, 41 A. 988 (1899);
In re Letizia, 27 Cambria Co. L.J. 30, 39 (Pa. C.P. 1965); In re Morris, 20
Del. Co. 470, 472 (Pa. C.P. 1930). Obtaining and preserving public confidence is essential not only in protecting the bar, but in other areas as well.
Public confidence as an intermediate goal of attorney discipline is more
fully discussed at notes 30-34 and accompanying text infra.
23. G. SHARswooD, AN EssAY ON PROFESSIONAL ETncs in 32 ABA REP.
9 (1907). This objective's importance was also emphasized by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court when Justice Drew noted:
The law is an ancient and honorable profession. Throughout its
whole existence it has been maintained in the confidence of the
people by the integrity of its members. The practice of the law
requires an almost sacred confidential relationship between lawyer
and client, and it must at once be perceived that whatever is necessary to maintain that confidence must be done, no matter the cost.
Moyerman's Case, 312 Pa. 555, 564, 167 A. 579, 583 (1933).
24. E.g., In re Gottesfeld, 245 Pa. 314, 317, 91 A. 494, 495 (1914).
25. In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 550 (1968).
26. Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265, 288 (1882); In re Oliensis, 26 Pa. Dist.
R. 853, 863 (C.P. Phila. 1917). See also In re Berlant, No. 348 at 2 (Pa.
Sup. Ct. E.D., April 13, 1973) where Chief Justice Jones stated: "Moreover,
the sanctions arising from such proceedings--censure, suspension, or disbarment-are not primarily designed for their punitive effects, but for their
positive effect of protecting the public and the integrity of the courts from
unfit lawyers."

although it might appear otherwise in light of the paucity of publicity given most disciplinary actions prior to the functioning of the
Board,'2 7 it would seem to be an "ostensible function of official enforcement of ethical norms to deter violators. ' 28 Such an objective
was noted by the Clark Committee when they declared that "[t] he
profession's self-policing role has several purposes, including .. .
,,2
deterring future misconduct . *...
An additional objective often mentioned by both the courts and
the profession and integrally related with the goals of protecting
the courts, the public and the profession is that of obtaining and
preserving public confidence. Indeed, it is this ideal, along with
the confidence and respect of the profession, which is held out as
the basic incentive for the individual practitioner to attain "the
highest possible degree of ethical conduct." 30 And it is "[t] he possible loss of that respect and confidence [which] is the ultimate
sanction" for a breach of the ethical rules.31
The objective of public confidence appears to act as an intermediate goal to achieve other ends rather than acting as an end
in itself. For example, public confidence is said to be necessary
so that the administration of justice might be maintained.3 2 It has
also been stated that this goal is essential to preserve the relationship of trust between attorney and client. 3s Thus, it seems evident
that this goal is related to other objectives which are to be attained
34
only upon achieving public confidence initially.
III.

UNDERLYING OBJECTIVES OF ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE

Although never officially espoused by either the courts or the
profession, it has recently been suggested by critics of the bar"
and individuals who have studied existing disciplinary structures
in the legal profession," that there exist other underlying goals
27. See notes 82-84 and accompanying text infra.
28. J. CARaNm, LAwyvms' ETmcs 159 (1966).
29. Special Committee on Disciplinary Enforcement, Problems and
Recommendations in Disciplinary Enforcement, 95 ABA REP.: 783, 893 (1970)
[hereinafter referred to as the Clark Report]; see also Comment, Public
Protection and Iowa's Attorney Reinstatement Policy, 56 IowA L. Rv. 430,
431 (1970-71).
30. Preamble To American Bar Association, Code of Professional Responsibility, 1969 [hereinafter referred to as ABA CODE].
31. Id.
32. ABA CODE, supra note 30, Ethical Consideration 9-1.
33. In re Letizia, 27 Cambria Co. L.J. 30, 39 (Pa. C.P. 1965).
34. The objective of public confidence also plays a role in the other
goals sought to be attained by the profession. These objectives and their
relation to the goal of public confidence will be discussed at the conclusion
of the following section. See note 66 and accompanying text infra.
35. E.g., M. BLOOM,TEm TEOUBLE WrrH LAWYERS (1968).
36. J. CARIN, LAwYEs' EThIcs (1966); Shuchman, Ethics and Legal
Ethics: The Propriety of the Canons as a Group Moral Code, 37 GEo. WASH.
L. REV. (1968-69).
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firmly accepted by the profession. An examination of the profession, its past and present disciplinary structure and the results
achieved thereunder reveals some support for the existence of these
goals.
The first of these objectives is an alleged dominant concern by
the organized bar to maintain the present system of self-discipline
or self-regulation. Some critics have expressed the view that this
concern is hardly more than an interest in self-protection.3 7 Jerome Carlin, a legal sociologist, reported in a study he made of the
New York City Bar 8 that there existed a gap between the bar's
espoused objectives of disciplinary enforcement and the objectives
they were in reality seeking to accomplish. Carlin felt that while
the organized bar in New York City professed to be pursuing the
traditionally espoused goals of protecting the public, the courts and
the profession, in reality the "bar through the operation of its formal disciplinary measures [seemed] to be less concerned with scrutinizing the moral integrity of the profession than with forestalling
public criticism and control. '3 9 Carlin accused the bar of being
more concerned with projecting the appearance of maintaining
strict discipline than with actually accomplishing it:
Further evidence that the organized bar is responding
primarily to a concern for preserving its public image is the
considerable importance of the visibility of the offense to
the general community in the handling of disciplinary
cases. Although visibility in general tends to force the
hand of enforcement officials, it seems here to be the overriding consideration, having an even greater effect on the
severity of the official sanction than the nature of the offense itself. It is consistent, however, with a desire to
avoid lay interference and control that the most widely
publicized violations should be the most severely and publicly sanctioned. Failure to punish visible violations might
result in public criticism of the bar, and the visibility itself
offers the profession an opportunity to demonstrate
to the
40
public that it can discipline its own members.
Carlin concluded that the more probable goal of the entire disciplinary efforts of the New York City Bar was the forestalling of
public criticism of the profession. 41 It has been suggested that
there is no reason to believe that the situation necessarily is dif37. M. BLOOM, THE TROUBLE WITH LAWYERS 158, 159 (1968); cf. Clark
Repurt, supra note 29, at 928.
38.

J. CARLIN, LAWYERs' ETmcs (1966).

39.

Id. at 161.

40.

Id. at 162.

41.

Id. at 170.

42
ferent outside the New York City area.
The organized bar itself has repeatedly demonstrated a concern
over the possibility of an intrusion into the present system of selfdiscipline. The American Bar Association created the Clark Committee43 in February 1967 to study the existing disciplinary structures and to report its findings together with its recommendations
for reform. The purpose was to enable the profession to "achieve
the highest possible standards of professional conduct and responsibility."'4 ' Despite such a directive, upon a reading of the Committee's final report, 45 there emerges a sense of overwhelming concern
for the bar's public image and the possibility that reform might
be thrust upon the profession from without. This reform might
terminate the exclusion of the public from participation in the disciplinary process. The Committee mandated that the profession itself
take immediate steps toward reform before it was too late:
The Committee emphasizes that the public dissatisfaction with the bar and the courts is much more intense than
is generally believed within the profession. The supreme
court of one state recently withdrew disciplinary jurisdiction from the bar and placed it in a statewide disciplinary
board of seven members, two of whom are laymen. This
should be a lesson to the profession that unless public dissatisfaction with existing disciplinary procedures is heeded
and concrete action taken to remedy the defects, the46 public
soon will insist on taking matters into its own hands.
The disciplinary agencies were urged throughout the report to
publicize their actions so that the public would be aware of "the
profession's concern for effective disciplinary enforcement and
[be] show [n] the steps taken by the bar to maintain its integ-

rity.""4

Following the position of the Clark Committee, Pennsylvania's
Special Committee on Disciplinary Procedures48 rejected suggestions that laymen be placed on the Board. 49 It preferred to con42. Hazard, ForwardTo J. CARLiN, LAWrms' ETifcs at xx (1966).
43. See note 3 supra.
44. Clark Report, supra note 29, at 791.
45. The report was issued after a comprehensive study of the existing
disciplinary structures and procedures in effect throughout the United
States.
46. Clark Report, supra note 29, at 798. An equally dramatic plea was

made by the Committee at 804, 805:

The profession does not have much time remaining to reform
its own disciplinary structure. Public dissatisfaction is increasing.
Proposals for public participation in the disciplinary process already have been made and, in at least one instance, have been implemented. Unless the profession as a whole is itself prepared to
initiate radical reforms promptly, fundamental changes in the disciplinary structure, imposed by those outside the profession, can be
expected.
47. Id. at 939.
48. See note 4 and accompanying text supra.
49. See note 5 supra.
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tinue the practice of complete self-discipline. Acceptance of such
a suggestion, according to the report, "in addition to the already
drastic changes suggested by us might well jeopardize the adoption
of our [suggestions] and also undermine the cooperation which is
essential to implement the proposed new system." 50
The profession has also expressed hostility toward the notion
of legislative interference with the disciplining of attorneys. The
Clark Committee urged that courts having disciplinary jurisdiction
exercise their power to invalidate legislative efforts to interfere in
this area.5 1 The basis for such a mandate is the asserted universally
recognized inherent power of the courts to discipline their own
52
officers.
Thus, the profession has clearly demonstrated its concern over
the possibility of outside interference with its present system of
self-discipline. 53 It has rejected suggestions for lay participation
on its disciplinary boards 54 and expressed hostility towards the concept of legislative interference in this area.55 It is argued that one
of the bar's goals in urging and seeking to effectuate publicized
attorney discipline is to give at least the appearance of disciplining
those deserving it thereby minimizing public criticism while preserving its unique system 56 of self-discipline. The thrust of this
argument is not that this is the sole or primary objective of maintaining discipline within the profession, but merely that it is one
of the underlying goals pursued in addition to the traditionally espoused goals.
The second of the underlying objectives is economic and political in nature. The organized bar has been accused of using legal
ethics and the existing sanctions for breaches of ethical rules as
a tool to protect and maintain its vested economic interests. 57 In
addition it is also argued by some that the ethical conflicts between
segments of the profession are essentially a political battle. 58
50. Supplemental Report of The Special Committee on Disciplinary
Procedures5, 6 (1971).
51. Clark Report, supra note 29, at 809.
52. E.g., In re Davies, 93 Pa. 116, 120, 121 (1880).
53. See note 46 and accompanying text supra.
54. See notes 48 and 49 and accompanying text supra.
55. See note 51 and accompanying text supra.
56. See note 86 and accompanying text infra.
57. J. CARiiN, LAWYERs' ETmcs (1966).
58. Shuchman, Ethics and Legal Ethics: The Propriety of the Canons
as a Group Moral Code, 37 GEO. WASH. L. Rlv. 244 (1968-69).
To what extent these allegations are true is not clear. It appears that some commentators have advanced such accusations
with little evidence to support them other than personal opinion.

. Since Jerome Carlin suggested that the profession was divided
into two classes, a marginal group and an elitist group, 50 critics
have suggested that legal ethics and lawyer discipline are largely
tools implemented by the elitist group to preserve their economic
status in the profession and in society in general. 60 It is in this
sense that the conflict has also been labeled political. One critic
expressed this view by writing that "a better resolution may be possible if the nonconforming acts termed unethical behavior are
viewed as the end product of a political conflict. . . . The LL's
[small law firms] as the deviants among lawyers, should make
explicit the economic basis of their political conflict with the BLF's
[large, prestigious law firms] ... ."61 Much of this conflict has
centered around the rules prohibiting solicitation and advertising.
It is argued that these prohibitions do not serve the public in any
manner, but "implicitly have to do with the preservation of a
monopoly within a monopoly,"16 2 referring to the efforts by the elite
group to maintain their position within the profession. Allegedly,
the struggle concerning these specific rules has little to do with
legitimate ethical objectives, but is primarily concerned with the
preservation of the elite group's economic power. The result is a
into grave problems of legal ethics
"battle over money, transformed
63
and the public interest.1
A similar argument was advanced as an explanation of the bar's
objective in disciplining those practitioners labeled "radical" whose
Yet others have reached the same conclusions after extended empirical study. It does seem correct to say that the organized bar
is at least partially motivated in the area of legal ethics and discipline by its economic interests. Whether or not this is properly
called "political" is a matter of individual choice.
59. J. CLnIN, LAwYEas' ETrmcs 36, 37 (1966). According to Carlin, the
marginal group consisted of the lawyers in small firms or practicing alone.
It was this group that were the chief violators of purely professional ethical
standards. Members of this group did not attend the better law schools
and their incomes were lower than the elite group. The elite group for
the most part went to the best law schools, practiced in the large firms,
came from old, established families and had higher incomes.
60. See generally Schuchman, Ethics and Legal Ethics: The Propriety
of the Canons as a Group Moral Code, 37 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 244 (196869); Comment, Controlling Lawyers by Bar Associations and Courts, 5
IHIAv. Cirv. Riors-Civ. LYB. L. REv. 301 (1970); Comment, Legal Ethics and
Professionalism,79 YALE, L.J. 1179 (1969-70).
61. Shuchman, Ethics and Legal Ethics: The Propriety of the Canons
as a Group Moral Code, 37 Gao. WASH. L. Ray. 244, 266, 267 (1968-69). The
author basically accepted Carlin's groups, but relabeled the marginal group
as LL's (small law firms and sole practitioners) and the elitist group as
BLF's (large, prestigious law firms).
62. Id. at 258.
63. Id. at 263. A like argument has been advanced concerning a segment of the bar's vehement opposition to group legal services. See Nahstoll, Limitations on Group Legal Services Arrangements Under The Code
of Professional Responsibility, DR 2-103(D) (5): Stale Wine in New Bottles, 48 TEx. L. REv. 334, 338, 339 (1969-70); Comment, Group Legal Services:
From Houston to Chicago, 79 DICK. L. REv. 621 (1974-75).
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clients consist substantially of the poor, minorities and the politically unpopular:
Protection of the bar's economic interests, rather than
improving the administration of justice, appears to be the
dominant motive in these actions. Bar association disciplinary proceedings and codes of "ethics" have been far
more effective in securing economic power and artificial
social prestige for the legal profession than in producing
4
honest, competent, and dedicated lawyers."
The basic motivation for the profession's efforts in the area of ethics
and discipline is seen as an attempt to weed out those "radical"
members who do not conform to the bar's conception of professional
propriety. These critics feel that despite "the aura with which the
ABA has attempted to surround it, the Code of Professional Responsibility is undeniably of political and economic rather than
spiritual derivation."'
Finally, the profession's concern for obtaining and preserving
the public's confidence could also be classified as an underlying objective. Since this goal was previously stated to be a traditionally
espoused objective,66 clarification is needed. This goal is a traditionally espoused goal, but it also serves other underlying purposes
as well. In the sense that this objective is implemented as an intermediate goal, it might be viewed as an essential requirement to the
accomplishing of the other underlying objectives discussed in this
section. 67 It seems evident that if the public does not have confidence in the present system, changes will eventually be brought
about through public pressure on the organized bar. These changes
could very well terminate the prsent system of self-discipline and
greatly disturb the social-economic structure of the bar. Thus,
the vital importance of making certain that the public is content
and confident with the status quo becomes obvious.
IV.

EVALUATION OF PRESENTLY EXISTING OBJECTIVES

The discussion in this section will center around the validity
or worthiness of the existing aims of attorney discipline. Included
will be an analysis of whether certain goals should be given a
64. Comment, Controlling Lawyers By Bar Associations and Courts,
5 HARv. Civ. Ri[GHTs-Crv. LiB. L. REv. 301, 302, 303 (1970).
65. Comment, Legal Ethics and Professionalism, 79 YALE L.J. 1179,
1187 (1969-70).
66. See notes 30-34 and accompanying text supra.
67. See notes 35-65 and accompanying text supra (for a general discussion of the objectives of preserving the present system of self-discipline
and protection of the bar's economic interests).

higher or lower priority than they now occupy. This section will
not attempt to determine whether or not these goals are actually
being accomplished in practice.
Protection of the public must be given first priority. 8 "Such
protection is important because of the unique position of trust and
responsibility which attorneys occupy, and, consequently, the serious harm which may result from their unethical conduct."0' 9 Since
the attorney does hold such a "unique position of trust," those who
come to him for assistance are not likely to be suspicious. To the
contrary, it seems more likely that the victim of the attorney's misconduct will be totally unsuspecting and put complete faith and
trust in him. Thus, the importance of this goal becomes apparent.
The offender must either be disciplined so that he will not repeat
the infraction in the future or be disbarred so that he will simply
be unable to further endanger the public. 70
Closely related to the importance of protecting the public is
the need to protect the courts and the administration of justice.
Since the courts in this country are for the benefit of the public,
it is difficult to distinguish between the need to protect them and
the need to protect the public. Yet both have been mentioned as
distinct objects of protection and it seems certain that both deserve
a high priority as goals of attorney discipline. The fact that an
attorney holds a "unique position of trust" applies also to his position as an officer of the court. Serious harm could result to the
system of justice if this trust was breached.
In addition to the emphasis given the aims of protecting the
public and the courts, a high priority has traditionally been given
to the protection of the bar. The profession has always guarded
and cherished its reputation for integrity and high moral standing.
Such an interest seems justified, but only to a limited extent:
With regard to the reputation of the bar, beyond the questions of professional economics and professional dignity,
lie the well justified assumptions that legal services are of
great value in the ordering of individual and community
affairs, and that full use of these services requires71 public
confidence in the skill and integrity of practitioners.
However, professional economics and professional dignity 72 in rela-

68. Clark Report, supra note 29, at 935.
69. Comment, The Imposition of DisciplinaryMeasures for the Misconduct of Attorneys, 52 COLUM. L. Rev. 1039 (1952).
70. The rationale of disbarment in such cases was stated by Justice
Drew in Moyerman's Case, 312 Pa. 555, 563, 167 A. 579, 582 (1933): "There
is only one discipline for such a man, for the protection of other possible
clients, and that is to put it out of his power to misuse his position as a
member of the bar, by disbarring him from further practice."
71. Selinger and Schoen, "To Purify the Bar:" A Constitutiona Approach to Non-ProfessionalMisconduct, 5 NAT. REs. J. 299, 348 (1965).
72. In reference to professional dignity, one writer stated that the bar,
"by requiring their members to be respectable citizens promotes an artifi-
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tion to this goal have played a larger role than seems justified. The
benefits resulting from the achievement of this goal accrue mostly
to the bar and not to the public or the individual client.73 This
consideration alone mandates that protection of the bar be given
a lower priority than either protection of the public or the courts.
Yet such a priority has not existed. One commentator74 noted this
in referring to the prior ethical guide for the profession, the Canons
of Ethics. They were supposedly designed for the protection of the
public, yet "their primary impact was upon lawyer-client and lawyer-lawyer relationships. Provisions setting forth the lawyer's
duty to the public . . . were often cast in general and seemingly

superficial terms."75
There is evidence that the profession is seeking to improve on this weakness. According to John Sutton, the Reporter
for the American Bar Association Special Committee on Re-evaluation of Ethical Standards, 76 the new Code of Professional Responsibility provides "specific provisions that were designed in the public interest. Along that line, several provisions of the old Canons
that might [have] appear [ed] to be designed to serve the profession
rather than the public were omitted from the Code. ''7 7 However,
despite such assurances, and while the profession might be moving
in the right direction in this respect, it has not yet completely
achieved the de-emphasis of this goal.
While some would contend that the protection of the public
interest"' should be the only goal of lawyer discipline and "the interest of the profession, however defined, should be regarded as
wholly extraneous to this determination," 79 the better view seems
cially favorable public image of the legal profession, enhancing the prestige,
mystique, and professional authority of lawyers. . . ." Comment, Controlling Lawyers By Bar Associations and Courts, 5 HARv. Civ. RiGHTs-Crv. LIB.

L. REv. 301, 329 (1970).
73.

Id.

74.

Id.

75. Id. at 306.
76. This Committee, known popularly as the Wright Committee,
drafted the Code of Professional Responsibility during the years 1965-69.
77.

Sutton, The Code of Professional Responsibility and Delivery of

Legal Services, 45 PA. B. Ass'N Q. 353 (1974). Parenthetically, the author
also noted that, "[t] he ABA Special Committee on Re-evaluation of Ethical
Standards ... had, as one of its prime goals in drafting the new Code, the
drafting of ethical norms and standards wholly from the viewpoint of the
public interest. . .

."

Id. at 362.

78. Protection of the public interest would seem to include protection
of both the public and the courts. See note 70 and accompanying text
supra.
79. Comment, Legal Ethics and Professionalism, 79 YALE L.J. 1179,
1196 (1969-70).

to be that protection of the bar should merely be given a lower
priority. For it is difficult to justify placing protection of the profession on an equal plane with protection of the public and the
courts. Admittedly, the profession's reputation does suffer from
the misconduct of its members. But such harm does not seem as
serious as the real damages resulting from situations where a client
or the courts are injured. Therefore, it is argued that while protection of the bar, and specifically, protection of the bar's reputation
for dignity and high standing is a valid objective, it has been given
too high a priority. Consequently, less emphasis should be given
to this objective by both the courts and the profession.
Deterrence is doubtlessly a valid goal. If future misconduct
of members of the bar can be prevented by the deterrent effect
of disciplining an offender of the ethical rules, the benefit accrues
to all. However, according to a study of the New York City Bar,80
two factors often tend to limit the deterrent effect of lawyer discipline: First, the fact that the most widespread violations generally
received the mildest sanctions and were the least likely to be formally adjudicated; second, over half the disbarments were by consent, in which case the record and the lawyers were not made public.81 Publicity of the disciplinary actions is essential if the disciplinary action is to have a deterrent effect. Simply stated, if a practitioner is unaware that disciplinary sanctions exist and will be
used, he will not be deterred by them.
In Pennsylvania, disciplinary proceedings are to be confidential
until and unless the Supreme Court orders the imposition of public
82
discipline or the offender requests that the matter be made public.
Additionally, the proceeding is not kept confidential if the action
is based upon a conviction of the attorney for a crime or, in matters
concerning disability, the Supreme Court orders the attorney transferred to inactive status.8 3 While possibly the deterrent effect resulting from a disciplinary action could be greater in Pennsylvania
if the rules permitted more publicity, the present rules seem justified because an attorney is protected from adverse publicity until
the charges are proved or he himself requests the charges be made
84
public.
A goal which deserves little support is the attempt by the bar
to maintain its present system of self-discipline. The legal profession is similar to other professions and quasi-professional associa80. J. CAIN, LAwynms' ETIcs (1966).
81. Id. at 161.
82. PA. R. DiscIpLINARY ENFORCEMET 17-23.
83. Id.
84. Cf. Commentary, The Bar and Watergate: Conversation with
Chesterfield Smith, 1 HASTnTGS CoN. L.Q. 31, 35 (1974). Mr. Smith stated:
"I would make disciplinary procedures public once we had passed the stage
of adjudicating whether a complaint is frivolous."
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tions in making its own rules of membership and determining its
own standards of conduct.8 5 Yet the legal profession is unique in
an important characteristic. When a member of the bar's misconduct violates the rights of another individual,
[t]he legal profession seeks to decide the issues without external regulation or outside participation. .

.

. Such

a

procedure can work when strictly professional breaches of
conduct are involved. But when community expectations
and client expectations are involved, the exclusion of "outsiders" from the entire disciplinary process is difficult to

justify.8 6

If the recent introspection by the legal profession as to discipline was prompted by the desire to "achieve the highest possible
standards of professional conduct and responsibility, 8 7 it is difficult to understand why the bar should insist that these goals be
achieved without any assistance from the public. It seems only reasonable that if the above stated objectives could be accomplished
with the assistance of able, concerned -members of the public, the
profession would be willing to admit lay members into its disciplinary machinery. Such a move would not only assist the profession
in achieving its above stated objectives, but would also be likely
to improve the bar's relations with the public (an espoused goal
of attorney discipline) 8 8 through improved public understanding
and active participation in the disciplinary process.
Whether such agencies would accomplish better results is not
clear. What is evident is that there are inherent dangers in a system of self-discipline. One writer stated: "In the Code of Professional Responsibility, as in the legal profession's previous code of
practice, self-regulation seems inevitably to lead to the compromise
or subordination of the public interest to the short-range interests
of the dominant segments of the profession."8 9 In light of this and
the fact that this goal is concerned only with the self-interests of
the bar and contrary to any concern for the public interest, this
aim is not entitled to any priority by the courts or the profession.
Another objective to be evaluated is the attempt to protect the
85. Gorden, Professional Discipline, 4 U. BRiT. COLUM. L. REv. 109
(1969).
86. Marks and Catheart, Discipline within the Legal Profession: Is It
Self-Regulation?, 1974 U. ILL. L.F. 193, 229.
87. Clark Report, supra note 29, at 791. See note 44 and accompanying
text supra.
88. Id. at 982.
89. Comment, Legal Ethics and Professionalism, 79 YAE L.J. 1179,
1197 (1969-70).

economic interests of the bar. Clearly, this goal is entirely selfcentered and demonstrates no concern for the public interest. Indeed, such an objective runs contrary to the concept of a profession
"in that, a profession lays claim to at least placing public duty
ahead of private gain." 90 It is difficult to imagine anyone contending that such an objective has any validity or is deserving of any
emphasis as a goal of attorney discipline.
As noted previously, 91 there are both traditional and underlying objectives to be achieved through the intermediate aim of obtaining and preserving public confidence through lawyer discipline.
When the end sought through this intermediate goal is public confidence in the courts and the administration of justice, the goal seems
entirely valid and worthy of a high priority.2 This goal also seems
valid when the end objective pursued is the protection of the bar's
reputation to maintain the necessary relationship of trust and confi93
dence between attorney and client.
However, when the final goals to be accomplished through the
cultivation of public confidence inure solely to the professional bar,
they no longer deserve emphasis by the courts. Thus, the validity
of this intermediate goal and the amount of emphasis it deserves
is dependent upon the ends for which it is implemented.

V.

RAISING THE LEvEL OF COMPETENCY: A SUGGESTED
ADDITIONAL GOAL

Several objectives of lawyer discipline, as suggested in the previous section, are valid goals. It is desirable that such goals be
given emphasis and priority by the courts and the profession in
imposing disciplinary sanctions on those members of the profession
found to have violated the ethical rules. However, there remains
another valid objective of attorney discipline which, unfortunately
is not actively pursued by either the courts or the profession.
While lip-service has been rendered to an attempt to either discipline or remove by disbarment those practitioners who are incompe94
tent, no substantial effort has been made in this area.
Surprisingly, it was not until the Code of Professional Respon90. Burger, A Sick Profession?, 5 TULSA L.J. 1, 12 (1968).
91. See notes 66-67 and accompanying text supra.
92. Selinger and Schoen, "To Purify the Bar:" A Constitutional Approach to Non-Professional Misconduct, 5 NAT. RES. J. 299, 347, 348 (1965),
wherein it was stated:
A judicial system could hardly be expected to bear up under the
strain of coercing enforcement of its every process and judgment.
Because public confidence in the ability and willingness of the
courts to reach just results undoubtedly promotes voluntary cooperation with judicial procedures, this confidence should be maintained, and if possible, enhanced.
93. See note 71 and accompanying text supra.
94. See generally Marks and Catheart, Discipline Within the Legal
Profession: Is It Self-Regulation?, 1974 U. ILL. L.F. 193.
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sibility included Canon 695 and its accompanying disciplinary
rules 96 that the profession made any formal requirement of competence of its members. The Canons of Professional Ethics, the predecessor of the Code of Professional Responsibility, contained no
statement or guideline concerning competence. 97 Yet despite the
present mandate of Canon 6 and the accompanying disciplinary
rules, incompetence abounds in the profession. Judge (now Chief
Justice of the United States Supreme Court) Warren Burger made
the statement that "the majority of lawyers who appear in court
are so poorly trained that they are not properly performing their
job. .

.""

In fact, Judge Burger contended that after speaking

to trial judges across the country, the problem of incompetence in
the profession was much worse than anyone had thought.
On the most favorable view expressed, seventy-five percent
of the lawyers appearing in the courtroom were deficient
by reason of poor preparation, inability to frame questions
properly, lack of ability to conduct a proper cross-examination, lack of ability to frame objections adequately, lack of
and lack of
basic analytic ability in the framing of issues 99
ability to make an adequate argument to a jury.
While the extent of incompetence in the profession is open to debate, if the situation even begins to approach Judge Burger's assessment, the importance of the goal of attaining a higher level of
competence in the profession becomes apparent.
Yet despite the Code's requirement that members of the bar
95. ABA CoDE, supra note 30. Canon 6 provides: "A lawyer should
represent a client competently."
96. ABA CoDc, supra note 30. The relevant rule is Disciplinary Rule
6-101, Failing to Act Competently, which states:
(A) A lawyer shall not:
(1) Handle a legal matter which he knows or should know
that he is not competent to handle, without associating
with him a lawyer who is competent to handle it.
(2) Handle a legal matter without preparation adequate in
the circumstances.
(3) Neglect a legal matter entrusted to him.
97. It appears that the closest statement was Canon 21 which stated:
"It is the duty of the lawyer not only to his client, but also to the Courts
and to the public to be punctual in attendance, and to be concise and direct
in the trial and disposition of causes." Cf. H. Dsnnm , LGAL EnnCs
(1965). The author, long the reporter for the ABA Standing Committee
on Ethics noted that "[t]here has never apparently been any extensive attempt to remove lawyers from active practice merely because they are or
have been obviously incompetent or careless in performing. their professional duties." Id. at 48 (emphasis added).
98. Burger, A Sick Profession?,5 TuLs.A J. 1 (1968).
99. Id. at 3.

573,

practice law competently 0 " and the apparent failure to comply
with this mandate, 0 1 the profession is not acting to rectify the
problem. Instead, "rather than engage in a review of performance,
something else has been the goal of the disciplinary agencies; their
proceedings have related solely to conduct. Existing disciplinary
processes have tended to imitate the criminal justice system rather
than to regulate the legal profession."10 2 The existing disciplinary
structures have tended to approach each complaint against an attorney looking solely for some type of moral fault or deviance in
his conduct.103 If the profession is to truly engage in self-regulation it must begin to review the attorney's performance without
searching for moral deviance: "Performance standards, as distinct
from conduct standards, need to be applied in a no-fault context,
there must be adequate opportunities to review lawyer performance, and there must be refined criteria on which to base continuing
judgments about competence."'10 4 Yet while this is truly needed,
the profession is either unwilling or unable to deal with the issue
of competence.
It is not clear that existing disciplinary boards are the proper
agencies to judge an attorney's performance in terms of whether
it meets an acceptable level of competence. However, the fact remains that the profession retains competence as an ethical requirement and has not yet created another agency to deal with this question. It appears, therefore, that achieving a higher level of competence in the profession has been a long neglected aim of the
profession. This is an objective that should be of primary concern
to both the courts and the profession in attorney discipline 0 5 if
the public is to be truly protected and the profession truly selfregulated. 0 6
100. See generally Marks and Catheart, Discipline Within the Legal
Profession: Is It Self-Regulation?, 1974 U. ILL. L.F. 193, 229-30 (for a
discussion on forming a usable standard of competence).
101. See notes 98-99 and accompanying text supra.
102. See, Marks and Catheart, Discipline Within the Legal Profession:
Is It Self-Regulation?, 1974 U. ILL. L. F. 193, 195-96. The authors define
performance as
How skill is applied for the execution of completion of a task. It
is devoid of any moral content or standards and assumes a standard
of and thus some agreement about, measurement. Conduct, in contrast, relates to the behavior of lawyers. It assumes both community and professional standards; .
Id. at 196.
103. Id. at 225.
104. Id. at 203.
105. The term "discipline" is used here to describe the area of regulation concerning both moral misconduct and competence in a no-fault con-

text.
106. There remains one additional suggestion to add to the list of valid

goals of attorney discipline. More properly stated, this is not strictly a goal,
but rather a general approach to the area of legal ethics and lawyer discipline which was suggested by Professor Cheatham. He suggested that legal
ethics should be guided more by positive considerations than by negative

ones:
In dealing with the new conditions the bar associations have for
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VI.

DiscUSSION OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE DISCIPLINARY
BOARD OF THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

The present disciplinary system in Pennsylvania began March
21, 1972.10T This system includes a totally new structure of organization throughout the Commonwealth as well as new procedures.
On June 19, 1969, the Board of Governance of the Pennslyvania
Bar authorized the appointment of a Special Committee on Disciplinary Procedures' 08 which was to examine "existing procedures in
Pennsylvania relating to discipline of lawyers and to submit recommendations for a more effective system."' 0 9 The study was the
basis for the report to the Board of Governance who in turn relied
on these findings in formulating their recommendations for a new
system to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. The Supreme Court
adopted the recommendations and the new system was born.1 0
the most part permitted the old negative rules to control the affirmative opportunities ....
Surely the opposite approach is the right
one, with the affirmative guiding and controlling the negative....
Their [ethics) like their roles are essentially affirmative, and the
professional restraints are intended to ensure the better performance of the affirmative roles.
E. CHEATHAm, A LAwYE Wsi-N NFmxED 80 (1963).
In essence, this approach would emphasize what the practitioner could
and should do; it would expose the numerous opportunities for fulfilling
this country's needs for competent legal assistance. It would properly focus
on the public rather than the profession itself and thus demonstrate the true
hallmark of a profession.
107. PA. R. DiscIpLINARY ENFORCEMENT 17-25, 446 Pa. xxiii.
108. This action was prompted by the findings of the Clark Report.
109. Initial Report of the Special Committee on Disciplinary Procedures
of the Board of Governance of the PennsylvaniaBar 1 (1971).
110. The present system of discipline in Pennsylvania replaced a loose
hodgepodge of numerous agencies with overlapping jurisdictions. The old
system was not centralized, but instead consisted of local courts, local bar
associations and the various committees and agencies they had created.
Basic inadequacies of the old system were to be rectified. According to
the Special Committee, these defects were:
(1) an overlapping of jurisdiction between the Board of Governance, the local courts and the agencies or tribunals created by
local courts or by the local bar associations. This created confusion in the eyes of the profession and the public alike and
led to conflicting methods of procedure and inconsistency in
sanctions imposed for comparable transgressions.
(2) no professional staff was responsible for the administration of
the overall disciplinary program and there was no adequate
financing available to establish and maintain a proper staff.
(3) the old system, relied (except in Philadelphia) upon the spare
time of volunteers, which fostered an inordinate delay in obtaining effective action. It was found to be unreasonable to
impose the burden of investigation on an aggrieved complaintant.
(4) the local agencies and courts frequently were very reluctant
to. impose disciplinary sanctions upon local lawyers and, too

This new system, briefly described, is a single statewide disciplinary system acting under the authority of the Supreme Court.
It has an adequately financed professional staff and a uniform procedure which meets all requirements of due process of law. The
system is controlled and financed by attorneys without lay participation. Additionally, the registration of all attorneys admitted to
practice in the state is required."' The new system also provides
separate procedures for determining incapacity and incompetence
of attorneys. 112 Structurally, the Disciplinary Board acts as the
disciplinary arm of the Supreme Court. Beneath the Board' are
the various Hearing Committees which, except in Philadelphia and
Allegheny Counties, are composed of attorneys, one-third of whom
are from the county and judicial district of the respondent, and
two-thirds of whom are from counties and judicial districts other
14
than the county and judicial district of the respondent.
This new system has been functioning for nearly two years.
In analyzing the functioning of the system during this period the
discussion will not attempt to evaluate the system, but will merely
examine a number of recommendations of the Board to determine
if the results reached comply with the previously discussed goals
of attorney discipline. Hopefully, a cross section of decisions will
be presented so as to give a balanced view of the functioning of
the system.
As stated earlier, protection of the public is a primary goal of
attorney discipline." 5 Thus, it is no surprise that the Board has
explicitly recognized this objective in most of its recommendations.
Yet while this goal has been recognized in these cases, it appears
that it was not always given the proper priority it deserved." 6
7
This was true in In re Green"1
which resulted in the Supreme
Court's acceptance of the Board's recommendation of suspension
with the right to apply for reinstatement in one year. Respondent,
Green, had embezzled $10,000 from an estate he represented. Howoften, friendship and politics overrode the public interest.

(5) no adequate procedures for prompt disciplinary action against
attorneys convicted of serious crimes reflecting upon their fitness to practice law.
(6) no established procedures for dealing with attorneys incapacitated by mental illness, senility, addiction to intoxicants, etc.
Id. at 3.
111. PA. R. DIsCPLINARY ENFORCETv 17-19.
112. Id. at 17-20. The rule refers to incapacity and incompetence in the
sense of inability to practice due to mental illness, senility and addiction
to intoxicants.
113. See note 5 supra.
114. For a more detailed understanding of the present system see generally PA. R. DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT 17-1 to 17-25 inclusive.
115.

See note 68 and accompanying text supra.

116. Id.
117. No. 25, 1973 Term (Pa. Sup. Ct. Disciplinary Bd., Mar. 22, 1974)
approved, No. 72, Disciplinary Dkt. 1 (Pa. Sup. Ct., E.D., Mar. 29, 1974).
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ever, the misconduct did not end there. For over six years the respondent lied about the money to both his client and the legatees
of the estate. He also refused to respond to inquiries concerning
the money. Finally, he deceived the investigator for the Board
and his own counsel. It was only upon the insistence of his counsel
that the respondent borrowed $10,000 and the interest due to repay
the estate.
Despite the seriousness of the misconduct, the Hearing Committee only recommended a private reprimand."'
The Board concluded that a reprimand was too light, yet recommended only a
suspension with the right to apply for reinstatement in one year.1 9
In opting for the light sentence, the Board relied on several mitigating circumstances: respondent had made full restitution, the
Hearing Committee's recommendation was entitled to great
weight, respondent was then 62 years of age, and in 40 years of
120
practice this was the first complaint against him.
The fact that respondent made restitution has doubtful value
as a mitigating circumstance. No restitution was made for six years
until respondent was discovered and near the point of conviction for
his misconduct. Then, and only then, when his counsel insisted
that he make restitution did respondent do so. In light of this action, it is difficult to justify the Board's consideration of restitution
as a mitigating circumstance. Most relevant to this point was the
Clark Committee's observation that an "attorney who has gone
beyond temptation and has converted funds obviously poses a
threat to any future client and the public.'' 1 The Clark Committee viewed with severe disapproval practices of some jurisdictions
which permitted the attorney to make restitution and receive either
a light sanction or none at all. It was also noted that:
Other jurisdictions, recognizing the broader public implications of serious misconduct by an attorney, have concluded
118. The following are the possible disciplinary sanctions in the order
of their severity:

(1) Disbarment by the Supreme Court.
(2) Suspension by the Supreme Court for a period not exceeding
five years.
(3) Public censure by the Supreme Court.
(4) Private reprimand by the Board.
(5) Private informal admonition by the Disciplinary Counsel.
PA. R.DIscIPLiNARY ENFORCEMENT 17-4.
119. In re Green, No. 25, 1973 Term at 7 (Pa. Sup. Ct. Disciplinary Bd.,
Mar. 22, 1974) approved, No. 72, Disciplinary Dkt. 1 (Pa. Sup. Ct., E.D.,
Mar. 29, 1974).
120. Id.
121. Clark Report, supra note 29, at 948.

that the policy of fostering restitution, useful as it may be
to the individual complaint, fails to protect the general
public from the malefactor and
is inconsistent with effec1 22
tive disciplinary enforcement.

Clearly, a recommendation of disbarment would have been more
consistent with protecting not only the public, but the courts and
the profession as well. In view of the possibility that the respondent could resume practice in one year, it does not seem that the
Board was truly acting in the public interest.
A recommehdation of the Board seemingly more consistent
with protecting the public was in In re Kail.12 The Board refused
to accept the unanimous recommendation of a conditional reinstatement of the petitioner made by the Hearing Committee. The petitioner had forged the endorsements of the executors on a check
belonging to an estate he was handling. In addition to converting
these funds, petitioner also converted cash he had belonging to the
estate. The total amount involved was nearly $6,000. Kail then
remained unavailable to the clients despite their numerous attempts
124
to contact him.
Faced with the choice of protecting Kail by recommending his
conditional reinstatement" 25 or strictly adhering to the goal of protecting the public interest, the Board chose the latter in refusing
to recommend reinstatement. The Board felt that the petitioner
had difficulty in accepting the responsibility for the fiscal mismanagement. Kail also refused to admit that he had previously
been disbarred, but contended that he had voluntarily resigned due
to personal reasons. These factors helped convince the Board that
the petitioner could no longer be endorsed to the public as worthy
126
of confidence in him as an attorney.
Generally, the Board's recommendations have been consistent
with protecting the courts and the bar. Decisions of the Board
consistent with protecting either the public, the bar or the courts
are usually in compliance with all three of these aims. This is true
of the Board's recommendation in In re Kail."2 7 It is interesting

to note that in that case, the Board specifically found that Kail
had failed to satisfy the test for reinstatement under Rule 17-18(c)
122. Id. at 893.
123. No. 1, 1973 Term (Pa. Sup. Ct. Disciplinary Bd., Dec. 14, 1973),
approved, No. 419 Miscell. Dkt. 18 (Pa. Sup. Ct., E.D. Jan. 28, 1974) (order

denying reinstatement reentered May 14, 1974).
124.

Id. at 4.

125. The conditional reinstatement would have permitted Kail's rein-

statement as a member of the Bar of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

"subject to the condition that he confine his practice to the Office of the
Attorney General of Pennsylvania or to the office of such other supervising
attorney as is approved by the Court." Id. at 2.
126. Id. at 7.
127. No. 1, 1973 Term (Pa. Sup. Ct. Disciplinary Bd., Dec. 14, 1973),
approved, No. 419 Miscell. Dkt. 18 (Pa. Sup. Ct., E.D., Jan. 28, 1974) (order
denying reinstatement reentered May 14, 1974).
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of the Rules of Disciplinary Enforcement 128 by not meeting "his
burden of establishing by clear and convincing evidence that he
[had] the moral qualifications, competency and learning in law re12 9
quired for admission to practice law in this Commonwealth." '
This recommendation evidences the fact that this test under Rule
17-18 (c) can be applied so as to comply with the protective goals
alluded to in the rule itself; that if the petitioner meets the burden,
his reinstatement "will be neither detrimental to the integrity and
standing of the bar or the administration of justice nor subversive
of the public interest."' 30 While this test "can" be an effective protective device against unethical practitioners, it remains for the
Board to so use it in all of its decisions.
One instance of where the Board seemingly failed in the proper
implementation of this test and hence a recommendation inconsistent with protecting the public, the courts and the bar was in In
re Rosengarten.3 ' The Board specifically found that the petitioner's reinstatement would "be neither detrimental to the integrity and standing of the bar or the administration of justice nor
subversive of the public interest. '13 2 Rosengarten was suspended
for one year for attempted bribery of an Internal Revenue Service
officer. He plea bargained and received a fine, three months imprisonment, and a promise that he would not be indicted for failing
to file federal tax returns for the years 1964-69. Following petitioner's prison term, one year probationary period
and one year sus33
pension from the bar, he sought reinstatement.
The Board recommended reinstatement specifically finding that
the petitioner had met his burden under Rule 17-18(c). This rule
provides in part that a suspended or disbarred attorney seeking
reinstatement
[s] hall have the burden of demonstrating by clear and
convincing evidence that he has the moral qualifications,
competency and learning in law required for admission to
practice law in this Commonwealth and that his resumption of the practice of law within the Commonwealth will
be neither detrimental to the integrity and standing of the
128.

PA. R. DIScIPLINARY ENFORcEMnNT. See note 134 and accompany-

ing text infra for a statement of the rule,
129. In re Kail, No. 1, 1973 Term at 5 (Pa. Sup. Ct. Disciplinary Ed.,
Dec. 14, 1973), approved, No. 419 Miscell. Dkt. 18 (Pa. Sup. Ct., E.D., Jan.

28, 1974) (order denying reinstatement reentered May 14, 1974).
130. PA. R. DscipIuAY ENFORCEmENr 17-18(c).
131. No. 37, 1973 Term (Pa. Sup. Ct. Disciplinary Ed., Mar. 20, 1974),
approved,No. 227, Miscell. Dkt. 19 (Pa. Sup. Ct., E.D., Mar. 28, 1974).

132. Id. at 3.
133.

Id.

bar or the administration
of justice nor subversive of the
34
public interest.1
It seems that Rosengarten met this burden by demonstrating two
things. The first was his excellent academic record which presumably satisfied the "learning of the law" requirement of the rule.
How this was established is not revealed in the report. The second
factor apparently went to his moral qualifications. This consisted
of a parade of "many friends and supporters who . . . vouched for

his honesty, integrity and moral fiber, who [would] help and reinforce petitioner to begin a new professional life with a clean
35
slate."1'
The alarming element in the recommendation for reinstatement
is that the burden under Rule 17-18(c) was met despite two very
unfavorable factors noted by the Board. 136 The petitioner's probation officer stated that he took the probation "very lightly" as evidenced by his frequent failure to respond to messages from him
and Rosengarten's failure to request permission to take a trip to
Las Vegas. Furthermore, Rosengarten would resume the practice
of law under heavy financial pressures because he owed the government $40,000 in unpaid taxes, interest and penalties. Such pressures were undoubtedly no assistance in overcoming the tempta1 7
tions that every practitioner faces almost daily.
The Clark Committee made the following statement concerning
the affirmative showing that should be required when a disbarred
or suspended attorney seeks reinstatement: "Proper application of
this standared means that it should be as difficult for the disbarred
attorney to be reinstated as it is for a law school graduate who
has been convicted of a crime to be licensed."' 138 It seems doubtful
that many law school graduates with a record such as Rosengarten's
would have been licensed after making a showing equivalent to his.
That the Board's recommendation in this matter did not comply
with the objectives of protecting the courts, the bar and the public
seems apparent. Bribery is an offense directly opposed to the alleged high moral fiber of the members of the bar. It is the type
of "misconduct [which] raises serious doubts about an attorney's
134. PA. R. DiscriipuNARY ENroncEmENT 17-18 (c).
135. In re Rosengarten, No. 37, 1973 Term at 4 (Pa. Sup. Ct. Disciplinary
Bd., Mar. 20, 1974), approved, No. 227, Miscell Dkt. 19 (Pa. Sup. Ct., E.D.,
Mar. 28, 1974).
136. Id. at 4.
137. Cf. In re Green, No. 25, 1973 Term at 3 (Pa. Sup. Ct. Disciplinary
Bd., Mar. 22, 1974) (concurring opinion), approved, No. 72, Disciplinary
Dkt. 1 (Pa. Sup. Ct., E.D., Mar. 29, 1974):
Thus, at the end of the suspension period, the lawyer who has been
totally removed from the law, may well then be in a far worse
financial situation than before-with all the inherent pressures and
risks of temptation that caused him to commingle and misappropriate clients funds in the first instance.
138. Clark Report, supra note 29, at 948.
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fitness for practice."'u 9 A recommendation seemingly more consistent with protecting the courts, the bar and the public would
have been to refuse reinstatement or require more of a showing
by the petitioner to meet the burden. Possibly, the Board could
have refused to consider reinstatement until Rosengarten paid the
back taxes owed to the government. This requirement would have
at least assured the Board that the petitioner would not be resuming his practice with heavy financial pressures. 140 Clearly, this case
raises serious doubts concerning the burden of persuasion under
Rule 17-18(c) and its effectiveness in protecting the courts, the bar
and the public.
While the goal of deterrence has not often been cited by the
Board, it would seem that it is at least an implicit consideration
in its recommendations. The Board's recommendation of disbarment in In re Winshel' 4' would appear to have a proper deterrent
effect. The respondent had engaged in a repeated courses of conduct involving neglect of his client's affairs, refusal to communicate
with his clients, co-mingling of funds, refusal to account for funds
placed in his possession and demanding exorbitant and excessive
fees for illusory services. 142 The Hearing Committee recommended
a suspension, but noted in its report that subsequent to its hearings
in the matter, it learned that respondent had been suspended for
five years as a result of another disciplinary proceeding. The Board
in reaching its recommendation of disbarment (which the Supreme
Court accepted) considered the five year suspension matter, 43 but
felt that the present misconduct of the respondent was sufficient
44
to sustain the disbarment recommendation.1
139. Selinger and Schoen, "To Purify the Bar." A Constitutional Approach to Non-ProfessionalMisconduct, 5 NAT. Rss. J. 299, 354 (1965).
140. See note 137 and accompanying text supra. This requirement
might be overly severe in some instances. A petitioner could very well
be financially unable to pay such a debt until he resumed practice.
141. No. 11 and 18, 1973 Term (Pa. Sup. Ct. Disciplinary Bd., June 28,
1974), approved, No. 69, Disciplinary Dkt. 1 (Pa. Sup. Ct., E.D., July 18,
1974).
142. The respondent also used these excessive fees in retaliation to the
clients' demands antd complaints.
143. Additional factors considered by the Board were that the respondent had demonstrated no remorse or responsibility for his actions and
had also delayed the proceeding a number of times so that he could produce
certain evidence which he failed to do.
144. In re Winshel, No. 11 and 18, 1973 Term at 4 (Pa. Sup. Ct. Disciplinary Bd., June 28, 1974), approved, No. 69 Disciplinary Dkt. 1 (Pa. Sup.
Ct., E.D., July 18, 1974). See also Disciplinary Counsel v. Fry, No. 70, 1974
Term at 11 (Pa. Sup. Ct. Disciplinary Bd., November 4, 1974) (recommending six month suspension), disapproved, No. 70, Disciplinary Dkt. 3 (Pa.

As a rule, it seems that the stricter the disciplinary sanction
imposed on the offender, the greater the deterrent effect. Admittedly, this is not a primary goal and hence the Board is justified
in imposing a lighter sanction where proper mitigating circumstances exist. However, the Board should realize that a show of
compassion for a brother attorney and a resulting lenient recommendation, while giving the individual respondent a second chance,
also serves notice on the entire profession; a notice which is essentially directly opposed to the goal of deterrence. Even more importantly, a failure to attain the goal of deterrence also results in
a failure to achieve other primary goals such as protection of the
public, the courts and the bar.
The goal of public confidence was emphasized by the Board
in recommending disbarment in In re Negley. 14 The Board felt
that the "respondent [had] shown himself to be unworthy of the
confidence of either the courts or the public of this Commonwealth
1' 46
in assuming the high responsibilities of an officer of the court.'
The respondent, Alexander Negley, had been tried and convicted
on a charge of voluntary manslaughter and after serving part of
his sentence was placed on parole on January 16, 1973.147 In making its recommendation to disbar Negley, the Board chose not to
follow the Hearing Committee's recommendation of suspension for
not more than five years. Apparently, the Board felt compelled
to impose a more severe sanction in view of the serious offense committed by the respondent.
Since the offense was serious, it seems proper that the Board
emphasized the goal of preserving public confidence. In applying
the test formulated in In re Alker,148 the Board realized that of
Sup. Ct., E.D., December 9, 1974) (public censure ordered) where the Board
expressly recognized deterrence as a goal:
Disciplinary Counsel has urged the Board to use the vehicle of
this case to declare to members of the bar that if they are convicted
of willful failure to file and pay their income taxes, they must recognize that their offense will lead to suspension from practice, the
term of suspension to be determined by the facts and circumstances
in each case. If the recommendation of the majority of the Board
is adopted by the Supreme Court, the message to the bar will come
through in clear and resounding tones.
145. No. 9, 1973 Term (Pa. Sup. Ct. Disciplinary Bd., June 29, 1974),
approved, No. 75, Disciplinary Dkt. 1 (Pa. Sup. Ct., E.D., July 17, 1974).
146. Id. at 10.
147. Id. at 1, 2.
148. 16 Pa. D. & C.2d 653, 661 (O.C. Phila. 1959), aff'd per curiam, 398
Pa. 188, 157 A.2d 749 (1960):
No strict technical rule has ever been adopted in this State. Our
rule is one of common sense and each case is judged on its own
circumstances. The true test in a disbarment proceeding is whether
the attorney's character, as shown by his conduct, makes him unfit
to practice law from the standpoint of protecting the public and
the courts. The disbarment of an attorney is, like his admission,
a judicial act, based upon due inquiry into his fitness for the office.
This test, which is cited often by the Board, affords the essential flexibility

to a tribunal hearing disciplinary matters. Before making a recommenda-
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"prime relevance in this determination is whether the Supreme
Court can continue to endorse the attorney as worthy of the serious
public trust which is attendant to the position of officer of the
court.'

14

In concluding that the respondent could not be so en-

dorsed, the Board analogized to a New Mexico case' 50 in which
an attorney received an indefinite suspension for involuntary manslaughter. The suspension was based on Supreme Court of New
Mexico Rule 2.01151 which the Board felt
[i]ncorporates the same basic considerations which are
relevant under Pennsylvania law to a disciplinary proceeding, [thus] it becomes obvious that the Court considered the conviction to directly affect the Respondentattorneys [sic] fitness to practice law in that it undermined
the confidence of both the public and the courts that the
attorney could be trusted in professional matters. This
ruling and the reasons, therefore, fit comfortably under the
Pennsylvania
principles governing disciplinary proceed152
ings.
It might also be noted that in view of the difficulty the Board
seemed to have in justifying its results, 53 it might possibly be time
for Pennsylvania to adopt a rule already accepted in New York1 54
tion, this test allows a disciplinary body to consider all the circumstances,

aggravating and mitigating, which are pertinent to the matter in question.
It seems clear that under this test, while the focus is on affording protection
to the public and the courts, the Board has been willing to consider the
profession's needs as well. See, e.g., In re Shettig, No. 49, 1973 Term (Pa.
Sup. Ct. Disciplinary Bd., Dec. 19, 1973), approved, No. 88 Miscell. Dkt. 19
(Pa. Sup. Ct., E.D., Jan. 28, 1974).
149. In re Negley, No. 9, 1973 Term at 10 (Pa. Sup. Ct. Disciplinary
Bd., June 29, 1974), approved, No. 75, Disciplinary Dkt. 1 (Pa. Sup. Ct., E.D.,
July 17, 1974).
150. In re Morris, 74 N.M. 679, 397 P.2d 475 (1964).
151. N.M.STAT.AN. § 21-2-1(3)-2.01 (1953):
All of the members of the bar have taken an oath to support
the Constitution and the laws of this state and of the United States.
As officers of the court, they are charged with obedience to these
laws, both in and out of court, and to observe the high standards
of professional conduct. Traditionally, standards for lawyers have
been higher than expected of laymen. A license to practice law
is a proclamation by this court that the holder is one to whom the
public may entrust professional matters. The lawyer must be true
to that trust and his confidential relationship to his client, whether
such client be a public body or a private individual.
152. In re Negley, No. 9, 1973 Term at 12, 13 (Pa. Sup. Ct. Disciplinary
Bd., June 29, 1974), approved, No. 75 Disciplinary Dkt. 1 (Pa. Sup. Ct., E.D.,
July 17, 1974).
153. It is also possible that the Board went to such great lengths to
justify a seemingly obvious recommendation because of the unusual contentions of the respondent, e.g., that Rule 17-14(a) of the Rules of Disciplinary
Enforcement was ex post facto in nature.
154. N.Y. JUDIcIARY LAw § 90(4) (McKinney 1968).

which mandates disbarment of an attorney convicted of any felony.
Alternatively, Pennsylvania should consider adopting the rule used
in the Federal Courts which provides that conviction of an attorney
for a felony is grounds for disbarment.' 5 5 Presently in Pennsylvania, the only grounds for discipline are acts or omissions which
violate the Code of Professional Responsibility. 156
Thus, it seems that the Board's reconmendation in Negley was
in compliance with the goal of preserving public confidence. Additionally, the Board in In re KailS1? noted that refusal of reinstatement was necessary if the public's confidence in the judicial system
was to be maintained. The Board quoted with approval a statement
of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in a disbarment case: "Courts
can command public confidence only as those who serve therein
are themselves observant of the law which it is the duty of the
courts to enforce."'-5 Public confidence in these cases appears to
be implemented as an intermediate goal to achieve both the objective of protecting the administration of justice and maintaining the
essential relationship of trust between attorney and client.
Yet it is also arguable that this intermediate goal was used in
furtherance of the underlying objective of preservation of the existing system of self-discipline. Since the misconduct involved in Kail,
and more specifically, that involved in Negley, was quite visible' 5 9
and reprehensible, disbarment of the respondents was essential to
convince the public that the bar is willing and able to maintain
effective discipline within the profession. The public's confidence
in and satisfaction with the present disciplinary structure is indispensable if the bar is to maintain the present system of total selfdiscipline.
While the Board's recommendation in In re Green'6" may seem
consistent with the bar's desire to protect its own,' a reading of
the Board's recommendation demonstrates the struggle the members engaged in in attempting to reach a proper decision. The Board
was concerned with three conflicting considerations: a concern for
155. See Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265, 272, 273 (1883); In re Braverman,
148 F. Supp. 56, 57 (D. Md. 1957).
156.

PA. R. DIscIpINARY ENFORCEMENT 17-3.

157. No. 1, 1973 Term (Pa. Sup. Ct. Disciplinary Bd., Dec. 14, 1973),
approved, No. 419 Miscell. Dkt. 18 (Pa. Sup. Ct., E.D., Jan. 28, 1974) (order
denying reinstatement reentered May 17, 1974); see notes 123-130 and accompanying text supra.
158. Id. at 7 citing Wolfe's Disbarment, 288 Pa. 331, 335, 135 A. 732, 733
(1927).
159. See note 40 and accompanying text supra.
160. No. 25, 1973 Term (Pa. Sup. Ct. Disciplinary Bd., Mar. 22, 1974),
approved, No. 72, Disciplinary Dkt. 1 (Pa. Sup. Ct., E.D., Mar. 29, 1974);
see notes 117-122 and accompanying text supra.
161. M. BLOOM, THE TROUBLE WiTH LAWYERS 158, 159 (1968). Protecting
brother attorneys is an ostensible advantage to a system of total self-discipline.
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protecting the public, compassion for the respondent, and a concern
for and responsibility to the profession. 16' In view of its recommendation, the primary consideration was compassion for the transgressor. Questionable practices such as this led the Clark Committee to remark that "courts in some jurisdictions are more concerned
with the personal predicament of the disbarred attorney than they
are with protecting the public .... ,1"3 Regardless of the applicability of that statement to Green, the recommendation certainly
demonstrates the inherent dangers in a system of self-discipline.
It is always possible that the public interest will be subordinated
to the interests of the profession.164
Other than a limited amount of questions concerning violations
of the Code of Professional Responsibility's rules for proper advertising and the prohibitions against solicitation, 1 5 no matters came
before the Board relevant to a discussion of the underlying goal
of protection of the bar's economic interests. It might be reiterated
that the arguments alleging the existence of this goal contend that
many of the profession's prohibitions against advertising and solicitation deal only with the economic interests of the bar and are irrelevant to the public interest.
Finally, a review of the matters which have come before the
disciplinary system in Pennsylvania lends credence to the proposition that competence is a long neglected goal of attorney discipline.
Competence in this sense is not meant to include neglect as provided
for in the Code of Professional Responsibility, 68 nor is it meant
to include any type of moral fault. Instead, competence as used
in this discussion refers to how skill is applied in the performance
67
of legal work.
The paucity of cases that the disciplinary system has dealt with
concerning competence of attorneys evidences the fact that the profession is either unable or unwilling to accept this as a goal of attorney discipline. 6 8 Only five matters came before the system which
162. In re Green, No. 25, 1973 Term at 2 (Pa. Sup. Ct. Disciplinary Bd.,
Mar. 22, 1974) (concurring opinion), approved, No. 72, Disciplinary Dkt. 1
(Pa. Sup. Ct., E.D., Mar. 29, 1974).

163.
164.

Clark Report, supra note 29, at 948.
See Comment, Legal Ethics and Professionalism,79 YALE L.J. 1179,

1197 (1969-70).
165. See generally ABA CoDE, supra note 30, Discn:IrNARY R. 2-101, 2102, 2-103, 2-104.
166. ABA CODE, supra note 30, DIscIPLiNRY R. 6-101 (A) (3).
167. See note 102 supra.
168. The point is strikingly demonstrated by a statement of the Board
in In re Fairorth, No. 307, 1973 Term at 4, 5 (Pa. Sup. Ct. Disciplinary Bd.,

dealt with an attorney's failure to perform competently. 169 Two
of these actions 170 involved violations of both Disciplinary Rule
6-101 (A) (1)171 and 6-101 (A) (2)172 and resulted in informal admonitions to the attorneys involved. An informal admonition was also
the result in a matter involving a violation of Disciplinary Rule
6-101 (A) (1). 17 3 The two other matters concerned alleged violations
of Disciplinary Rule 6-101(A)(2). Although it was not clear that
the Hearing Committee found a violation of the rule, one action
resulted in an informal admonition to the respondent.17 4 In the
other action, 75 the attorney was found to have acted incompetently
in violation of Disciplinary Rule 6-101 (A) (2) and received a private
1 76
reprimand.
Jan. 3, 1973) (recommending denial of reinstatement), approved, No. 3, Disciplinary Dkt. 1 (Pa. Sup. Ct. W.D., Jan. 17, 1974): "Although no appellate
authority in point can be found in Pennsylvania, the Courts of California
have stated that the public in its dealings with the legal profession deserves
protection from incompetency as well as from knavery." Re Cate, 77 Cal.
App. 495, 247 P. 231 (1926) (emphasis added).
169. In re Anonymous, No. 61-D, 1972 Term at 27 (Pa. Sup. Ct. Disciplinary Bd.) (failure to file a claim prior to deadline); In re Anonymous,
No. 15-B, 1972 Term at 34 (Pa. Sup. Ct. Disciplinary Ed.) (failure to competently handle client's estate); In re Anonymous, No. 117-B, 118-B, 1973
Term at 20 (Pa. Sup. Ct. Disciplinary Ed.) (respondent failed to pursue
divorce actions for seven months in one case and four years in another);
In re Anonymous, No. 40, 1973 Term at 16 (Pa. Sup. Ct. Disciplinary Bd.,
April 19, 1974) (respondent failed to redeem realty from county lien); In
re Anonymous, No. 31, 42, 1973 Term at 27 (Pa. Sup. Ct. Disciplinary Bd.,
July 26, 1974) (respondent allowed the statute of limitations to run before
filing an action), as reported in The Disciplinary Board of the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania, Summaries of Discipline Imposed on Pennsylvania
Attorneys During The Period November 1, 1972 through June 30, 1974 and
and July 1, 1974 through November 30, 1974 [hereinafter cited as Disciplinary Ed. Summaries].
170. Disciplinary Bd. Summaries, supra note 169; In re Anonymous, No.
61-D 1972 Term at 27 (Pa. Sup. Ct. Disciplinary Bd.) (failure to file a claim
prior to deadline); In re Anonymous, No. 15-B, 1972 Term at 34 (Pa. Sup.
Ct. Disciplinary Bd.) (failure to competently handle client's estate) (Summaries July 1, 1974 through November 30, 1974).
171. ABA CODE, supra note 30. The rule provides: "A lawyer shall
not: (1) Handle a legal matter which he knows or should know that he
is not competent to handle, without associating with him a lawyer who is
competent to handle it."
172. ABA CODE, supra note 30. The rule provides: "A lawyer shall
not: (2) Handle a legal matter without preparation adequate in the circumstances."
173. Disciplinary Ed. Summaries, supra note 169, In re Anonymous, No.
117-B, 118-B, 1973 Term at 20 (Pa. Sup. Ct. Disciplinary Bd.) (respondent
failed to pursue divorce actions for seven months in one case and four years
in another) (Summaries November 1, 1972 through June 30, 1974).
174. Disciplinary Ed. Summaries, supra note 169, In re Anonymous, No.
40, 1973 Term at 16 (Pa. Sup. Ct. Disciplinary Ed., April 19, 1974) (respondent failed to redeem realty from county lien) (Summaries November
1, 1972 through June 30, 1974).
175. Disciplinary Bd. Summaries, supra note 169, In re Anonymous, No.
31, 42, 1973 Term at 27 (Pa. Sup. Ct. Disciplinary Ed., July 26, 1974) (respondent allowed the statute of limitations to run before filing an action)
(Summaries November 1, 1972 through June 30, 1974).
176. An additional matter came before the Board concerning an alleged
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Whether the resulting disciplinary sanctions imposed in these
cases were in compliance with the goal of competence is irrelevant.
The thrust of the demonstration is that the present system has not
embraced competence as a goal of attorney discipline. A failure
by the profession to adopt competence as an objective not only results in a failure to protect the public from substandard legal work,
but also demonstrates that the profession is not willing to truly
engage in effective self-discipline.
VIL

CONCLUSION

The espoused goals of attorney discipline in Pennsylvania are
numerous. Yet it is submitted that there is evidence to support
a conclusion that there are additional, underlying objectives being
pursued by the legal profession in the imposition of disciplinary
sanctions.1 77 The validity of these underlying goals is to be questioned in view of their doubtful concern for the public interest.
Furthermore, though several of the espoused aims of attorney
discipline are valid goals, one seemingly primary objective has been
neglected. This is the goal of pursuing a higher level of competence
in the legal profession through either disciplining or removing attorneys unable to meet a professional level of skill in their legal
78
work'1
Finally, the new disciplinary system in Pennsylvania has generally retained the previously existing objectives of attorney discipline. Additionally, the new system has continued the neglect of
the goal of competence as was demonstrated by the paucity of competence issues coming before it.179 If these matters are not being
brought before the system by client complaint, it would seem that
it is time to initiate other procedures to review the performance
of the Commonwealth's practitioners in a no-fault context.

DAVID E. HOLLAND

violation of Disciplinary Rule 6-101. Although it was not specified as to
what section was violated, it appeared to be a matter of neglect; see Disciplinary Bd. Summaries, supra note 169, In re Anonymous, No. 24, 1973 Term
at 4 (Pa. Sup. Ct. Disciplinary Bd., Feb. 28, 1974) (respondent failed to record deed for over one year despite numerous requests to do so; respondent
also made misrepresentations to a client concerning the filing of an action)
(Summaries November 1, 1972 through June 30, 1974).
177. See notes 35-67 and accompanying text supra.
178. See notes 94-106 and accompanying text supra.
179. See notes 166-176 and accompanying text supra.

